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1. Being moral, or being natural?
Ethics has not been much concerned in the human relationship with
 
nature,until the debasement of the biosphere by the effects of modern
 
civilization provoked the surge of environmental ethics. Concurrently,
ethology showed that animal morals were not so alien to ours as we used
 
to believe. This led to reconsidering on two planes the question of the
 
relation between morals and nature. Henceforth,we cannot dissociate
 
moral questions from their foundation in the natural order.
Now,though the terms of the problem are new,the problem itself
 
is a very ancient one. Indeed,it has been going a long time since people
 
started to ask whether nature is good or bad;in other words, since
 
people questioned about the relation between nature and morals. This
 
problem is posed in the Gorgias,a Platonic dialogue in which we see
 
Callicles opposing to Socrates the idea that,in the human polity as well
 
as in nature, it falls to the stronger to rule over the weaker. Law,
which for its part establishes the right by discriminating the just from
 
the unjust,is no more than the defence of the weaker,and has no other
 
foundation than the numeric majority of the weaker. On the contrary,
natural justice asks for the stronger to dominate.
This sort of view has travelled down the ages. We find it again in
 
Nazism,with the idea that one has the right to be cruel,since nature is
 
cruel. This amounts either to a pure cynicism(nature is bad,and that’s
 
just too bad for the weaker), or, for instance in Nietzsche’s case, to
 
striving to overcome the narrow frame of established morals in order to
 
found it anew in the wider order of nature. In a word,that would be to
 
recosmize the social order. This question was already looming in the
 
discussion between Socrates and Callicles. It is contained in the very
 
word kosmos, which primarily means “order”, and strongly connotes
 
positive qualities. This same term might as well mean“the universe”
as designate the highest magistrate,a woman’s finery,or the sky. In
 
short, the Good, the Beautiful, the Truth. Now, modernity has dis-
sociated that set. Astrophysics bears no relationship with cosmetics,
nor does magistracy with cosmology. Human values have turned away
 
from the universe:they are decosmized. But then,how can we justify
 
justice?
Let us first pose that the respective otherness of the cultural and the
 
natural,in itself,does not prevent from founding morals in nature;on
 
the contrary, it is a necessary condition for morals to be founded.
Mutatis mutandis,this has been shown by Go?del’s theorems,which say
 
that a system of propositions can be consistent only if it refers outside
 
of itself. In other words,morals cannot be founded for moral reasons.
It needs a base outside of morals.
This base is precisely nature. Not that nature should be a model
 
for morals;but because it is that toward which morals finds its consis-
tency. In this relationship,neither term can be reduced to the other;
they are respectively in a position analogous to that of the subject and
 
the predicate in logics. Here the subject (that which the matter is
 
about) is nature, and the predicate (that which interprets nature) is
 
morals.
Indeed, human societies have never ceased to interpret nature in
 
moral terms. We just have seen a few examples,which would tend to
 
show nature in a morally negative light;but the opposite view also
 
exists,and in fact predominates. The myths of Eden or of the Golden
 
Age in Europe,that of the Great Identity(Datong大同)in China both
 
idealize an original state in which nature and morals were in harmony.
If Christianity in general has considered nature as bad, heretics like
 
Pelagius or saints like Francis of Assisi have illustrated opposite con-
ceptions. Taoism for its part sees the cause of all evil in human artifice
(zuowei作為),and advocates unartifice(wuwei無為),which gives vent
 
to the natural(ziran 自然).
Heidegger shows a similar idea when opposing Erzeugnis (inten-
tional production) to Ereignis (event, “let-come-to-presence”). In
 
both cases(Taoism or Heidegger),we are in the wake of the myth of
 
the Golden Age or of Datong,that is,the longing for an age when work
 
had not yet severed the humans from nature. Work, indeed, is that
 
which transforms nature,and by so doing turns us away from it. Now,
the fact is that,in China as well as in Europe,morals―be it Christian or
 
Confucian―has valorised work rather than “let-come-to-presence”.
Our world is indeed based on artifice;and,unless we reject it,like did
 
the Fathers of the Desert in early Christendom or Chinese hermits under
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the Six Dynasties,the domain where morals should reign is nothing else
 
than the world.
This exigency is for us all the more pressing as our world,to day,
is overtly conflicting with the Earth which bears it, and as in this
 
conflict―the devastation of biodiversity,global warming etc.―,it is not
 
the Earth which is jeopardized. The Earth has seen worse;but what is
 
jeopardized is our world,with its morals;and this is why,more than
 
ever,we have to found our morals in nature anew.
2. Natural history and human history
 
The conceptual difficulty which we find in according morals with nature
 
largely comes from modern dualism,for which nature is an object:the
 
object of the“natural sciences”,which one categorically distinguishes
 
from the“moral and political sciences”,the latter concerning the human
 
subject. Now, in dualism, the object is supposed to be neutral, un-
related with our values,be these moral or not. This is why,for being
 
scientific,one must describe,not prescribe;because nature is a matter of
 
is,not of should. This entails an aporia,which is a major embarrass-
ment for environmental ethics:how can we found,in the moral neutral-
ity of ecosystems, the axiology of an ethics? In other words, if the
 
human is subsumed under the ecological,why should we,differing from
 
all other living species,impose ourselves duties toward the biosphere?
And if we do,are not we,by this very fact,founded in posing ourselves
 
on our own? Which is precisely that which ecology objects to.
The most consistent answers to such problems amount to common
 
sense:it is our own interest to modify our behaviour,since it jeopardizes
 
our own existence as well as the rest of the biosphere. Yet this has
 
nothing to do with ethics as such;the matter is only to be more reason-
able. True, there are some trends of thought which go beyond such
 
evidences. In the view of Arne Naess’deep ecology,nature is a great
 
Self which encompasses our own,expresses itself through us,and which
 
we must respect. Yet,this mystical view does not in the least solve the
 
above aporia;which is that nature as such,i.e.as the neutral object of
 
ecology,cannot found morals. Deep ecology is in fact a very shallow
 
ontology. Now, there cannot exist an ethics without an ontology,
which in this matter supposes to overcome modern dualism.
This is why the environmental crisis has furthered the surge of
 
various currents which, confusing the subject and the object, reject
 
modern rationalism,for instance by divinizing the Earth in the wake of
 
the Gaia hypothesis, by reinventing druidism, by fetishizing organic
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products,etc. Such effusions do not go beyond symptoms;their drift in
 
the irrational, on the contrary, show that we have not overcome the
 
aporias of dualism. For sure, they testify that we need to change
 
course, but they do not make us move one inch closer to solving the
 
problem which was already posed by Callicles.
This problem is indeed unsolvable as long as one does not see that
“nature”is not a data which,in itself,would be good or bad,a model or
 
a foil,or just neutral,but something which forever remains“to be born”
(natura,future participle of the verb nascor,be born)together with our
 
own existence,and within our very existence. Hence it is fraught with
 
human values;which it to say,as well,that our values are fraught with
 
nature. This idea can already be found,virtually,in Plato’s Timaeus,
the conclusion of which affirms that the kosmos(the world)born from
 
the Demiurge’s hands is “very big,very good,very beautiful and very
 
perfect”(megistos kai aristos kallistos te kai teleo?tatos).
But let us put aside metaphysics. The scientific study of animal
 
worlds has led Uexku?ll―one of the fathers of ethology―to establish a
 
decisive distinction between Umgebung (the objective data of the envi-
ronment) and Umwelt (the ambient world of a given species). At
 
about the same time,in the thirties,Watsuji established a homologous,
and equally revolutionary distinction between kankyo? 環境 (the objec-
tive environment)and fu?do 風土 (a human milieu). One can retain
 
from this homology that,at the ontological level of the living in general
(which is ecological) as well as at that of the human in particular
(which is not only ecological,but also techno-symbolical),reality does
 
not confront point-blank subjects to objects;it is instituted historically
 
by the relationship between a certain being (individuals, societies,
species...)and its milieu,while at the same time instituting both the
 
individual being and its milieu as such. It makes them exist according
 
to one another. Being and milieu are thus fit to one another,and this
 
is why Plato could write that the kosmos is aristos―the best possible one.
He could have written the same about the Umwelt of any living species.
In short,in natural as well as in human history,both being―that
 
which Plato,in the Timaeus,calls genesis(birth)―and its milieu are“to
 
be born”from one another. They exist in this mutual natura,i.e.in a
 
mutual begetting. And it is this birth, not the aporias of modern
 
dualism,that morals proceed from,instead of being opposed or reduced
 
to that objective data which“nature”,for the modern,is supposed to be.
［No.174  JCSC
 3. Nature and ethics
 
This entails a first moral principle,certainly the most fundamental of
 
all:condemning individual egoism,inasmuch as it is contrary to the very
 
dynamics (the natura) of our existence and of our milieu. Now,
modern individualism favours such an egoism, since it amounts to
 
locking out (forcluding) this natura as an object alien to our being.
This forclusion is therefore morally condemnable, regarding both the
 
environment and our fellow creatures. Indeed,morals is nothing else
 
than this ontological relationship with what is not ourselves but,as our
 
milieu,participates in our own being,to begin with other people.
Accordingly,we can now recosmize morals,by founding it anew in
 
nature and thus giving it a firmer base than if it were just revolving on
 
itself. Once more,“founding”does not mean“reducing to”. Reducing
 
morals to nature, or ethics to ecology, is that which Callicles was
 
advocating;but founding morals in nature is to acknowledge the struc-
tural,yet forever“to be born”relationship of each of us with our milieu,
that is with other people and with other living beings,as well as with the
 
things which surround us.
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